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Industrial Leadership in Science Based Industries.
A co-evolution model.
∗
Abstract
In this paper, we seek to analyse the role of national university systems in combination with
technological and market factors as sources of industrial leadership and industry growth in science-
based industries. We propose a model in which national university systems and their respective
national firms and industries are considered as co-evolving. National firms compete on a worldwide
level and they rely on the progress of science and the availability of scientists to innovate. As the
global industry develops, firms try to mold their national university systems, but they achieve
diﬀerent degrees of success. Apart from highlighting the role of institutional responsiveness as a
source of competitive advantage, our model points to the access to essential inputs for production,
the technological and strategic characteristics of firms, the international diﬀusion of knowledge,
and the initial distribution of market demand as key sources of leadership and industry growth.
The international mobility of scientists seems to foster the emergence of industrial leadership shifts.
Keywords: Industrial leadership; innovation; diﬀusion; institutions; evolutionary economics.
JEL-Code: O33; C61; B52
∗I would like to thank Richard R. Nelson for his comments and suggestions on previous versions of this
work.
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1 Introduction
The development of many high-technology industries has witnessed the emergence of
strong leadership positions. Thus, for example, the rise of science-based industries in
Germany and other countries of continental Europe at the end of the 19th century (Mur-
mann, 2003), or the consolidation of the American technological leadership during the
post-WWII era (Nelson and Wright, 1992) illustrate the relevance of industrial leadership
in science-based industries. In more recent times, the rapid growth of the Asian NICs came
about because these countries managed to master complex electronics-based technologies
to the extent of catching up with and, later, forging ahead of previous industrial leaders
in high-tech industries (Amsden, 2001).
These episodes present economic theory with serious challenges summarized in three
important questions. The first question regards the need to clarify what the sources
of industrial leadership in high-tech industries are. Recent contributions point to the co-
evolution between universities and a number of institutional, technological and market fac-
tors as key mechanisms underlying leadership and industrial leadership shifts (Rosenberg
and Nelson, 1994; Mowery and Sampat, 2005). However, despite the excellent empirical,
historical and appreciative studies that support this idea, our theoretical understanding
of the processes involved is still far from satisfactory (Mowery and Nelson, 1999).
The second question concerns the need to go beyond the immediate factors - capi-
tal accumulation, human capital and technical change - that usually explain growth in
contemporary models. The complex techno-institutional changes, which have made the
science-based industrial transformations in Western Europe, the US or South-East Asia
possible, overwhelm the explicative capacity of most theoretical models, in which institu-
tions play an exogenous and minor role. Abramovitz (1952) pointed out this shortcoming
1
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more than fifty years ago, but it still remains an open issue today (North, 1990; Nelson,
2005).
The last question regards the theory of economic development. If we pose the challenge
of development as a catch-up problem - very much in the spirit of Gerschenkron (1962)
or Freeman (2004) - episodes as surprising as the strong rise of Japan during the 20th
century or, more recently, the cases of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore or Brazil show how
little we know about the role of supporting institutions in economic development. In this
respect, Mazzoleni and Nelson (2007) have argued that, in order to catch up in the 21st
century, developing nations may need to adapt certain institutions - domestic university
systems and public research institutions - to generate more strength in the relevant fields
of science and technology1 . If this is so, for emergent nations to catch up will require
a proper understanding of the subtle mechanisms of institutional change (Cimoli et al.,
2006).
In this work, we take on the aforementioned challenges by proposing a co-evolution
model of institutions and technology that should be able to shed new light on the sources
of industrial leadership in high-tech industries. Furthermore, our proposed model assumes
a major role for institutions in economic growth, and it fits with the conception of devel-
opment as a catch-up problem.
In our model, heterogeneous for-profit firms, with distinct national identities, co-evolve
with their respective national university systems. Firms compete on a worldwide level in
a science-based industry, and they drive technological change and industry growth. Since
we will assume that firms fund capacity growth out of current profits, whether they grow
1 Reasons for this adaptations include the stricter legal conditions established by the WTO, the in-
creased protection of intellectual property rights in the TRIPS agreement, and the powerful contemporary
expansion in many fields of application-oriented sciences.
2
Page 5 of 48
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
or fall into decline depends on their profitability. Likewise, we consider that firms carry
out R&D to come up with new processes that increase productivity at the firm level.
The key input for firms to carry out R&D are scientists, who are trained in national
university systems. We characterize these institutions in such a way that they show dif-
ferent degrees of institutional responsiveness to the industry needs in diﬀerent nations.
In the most complex version of the model, we consider that scientists may migrate to
foreign industries, depending on wage diﬀerentials and on other non-monetary considera-
tions. We also assume (implicitly) the role of other supporting institutions (public agencies
and labs, government programs or international associations) which underlie each nation’s
absorptive capacity of foreign technology.
The dynamics of industrial leadership and industry growth in the model arise from the
combination of technological, institutional and market factors. Technological and strate-
gic factors include the firms’ technological capabilities (which underlie the productivity
of R&D), the firms’ diﬀerential willingness to carry out R&D, and the type of returns to
scale that may exist within our modeled industry. Market factors include the size and
initial distribution of market demand, and the diﬀerent prices at which firms from distinct
nations can obtain essential inputs for production. The rhythm at which firms invest in
capacity growth or the initial distribution of scientific salaries among nations may also be
considered as market factors. Finally, the institutional factors include the uneven respon-
siveness of domestic university systems, the degree of international mobility of scientists,
and the eﬀectiveness with which national institutions allow for the assimilation of foreign
technology.
Our model fits in with the literature on evolutionary modeling2 , but it includes signif-
2 See Silverberg and Verspagen (2005) for a detailed survey of this literature.
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icant methodological and theoretical innovations. Regarding theory, our model responds
to recent claims by Nelson (2005) and Verspagen (2005) who have pointed out that formal
evolutionary theorizing could enter into rapidly decreasing returns if it does not incorpo-
rate mechanisms of co-evolution between institutions and technology into a new generation
of models. Malerba (2006) also points out the analysis of co-evolution processes as being
a pending research path at the theoretical frontier of evolutionary economics. We try to
move forward in this direction by considering, in our model, elements such as the higher
or lower flexibility with which university budgets and training priorities adapt to indus-
try needs, the determinants of the international mobility of highly-skilled labor, and the
existence of institutions that support the absorptive capacity of nations.
Regarding methodology, we agree with Silverberg and Soete (1994) or Silverberg and
Verspagen (2005) in that evolutionary theorists face the methodological challenge of devel-
oping more practically relevant models. As Verspagen (2005) claims, formal evolutionary
theory rarely generates precise results, mostly as a consequence of the nature of available
models, which involve very complex interactions generating rather unpredictable (and ob-
scure) dynamics. One way to overcome this limitation would be to build up a new class
of models on the basis of "relatively simple, evolutionary microeconomic foundations to
generate a broader range of phenomena in the evolutionary interpretation of technology
and growth, rather than increasing the sophistication of the microfoundations" (Verspa-
gen, 2005, p. 501). In our model, we delineate a minimal set of assumptions that, without
evading the inherent complexity of economic change, attempts to oﬀer precise results via
the combined use of analytical tools, and the econometric analysis of simulation results.
More precisely, we explore the model in diﬀerent settings, with increasing complexity,
so that we can obtain local analytical results by using Taylor polynomial approximations.
4
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Later, we check the global validity of these results through simulations, and go into specific
questions in greater depth via an econometric analysis.
Furthermore, despite the abstract and clearly theoretical character of our model, we
believe that it shows plausible properties which fit (in a qualitative and stylized way)
well-known facts that have been observed in the evolution of high-tech industries and
other processes of economic change. Thus, we can mention the following stylized facts
(see Mowery and Nelson, 1999; Murmann, 2003):
1. The evolution of science-based industries shows the emergence of strong leadership
positions, which may be altered by surprising leadership shifts.
2. The market shares and the proportion of scientists working in each national industry
display strongly-related dynamic patterns.
3. There is sustained growth in the levels of production and productivity in the distinct
national industries and at the worldwide level.
4. The growth rates of output and productivity in distinct national industries are dif-
ferent.
5. The unit price of the final product falls as technology progresses and production
rises.
6. There is a relationship between the rate of investment and the firms’ profit rate.
Apart from reproducing these generally-accepted facts, our model also oﬀers new re-
sults. As a brief anticipation of some of our results, we can mention the following findings:
1. The technological capabilities of firms, cheap access to essential production inputs,
and institutional responsiveness are the factors most favoring industrial leadership
5
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and industry growth.
2. The international diﬀusion of knowledge and technology increases the productivity of
R&D while also reinforcing the role of cheap access to essential inputs for production
(such as energy and raw materials) as a source of leadership. Obviously, this result
leads to interesting reflections on economic development and, specifically, on the
future of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China).
3. The R&D to sales ratio plays an ambiguous role as a source of leadership. Thus,
maintaining a high R&D to sales ratio is not always the most eﬃcient strategic
behavior.
4. It is possible that industrial leadership may be achieved by a national firm which is
not especially strong in any of the mentioned leadership factors but which enjoys a
suﬃciently favorable combination of said factors.
5. The model shows that, in order to maintain a position in the global market, a
minimum (variable) stock of scientists is necessary. This result should make us
reflect on the key role of university systems for nations seeking to catch up.
6. Finally, the mobility of scientists strengthens the technological capacity of the re-
ceiving nation and its possibilities of leadership. Mobility makes leadership changes
more probable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we present the co-evolution model in
Section 2. We show how the model can be explored in diﬀerent settings moving, with in-
creasing complexity, from a single industry version to a multi-industry version. In Sections
3 and 4, we carry out the dynamic analysis of the model without international mobility
6
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of scientists. We explore the role of diﬀerent factors in industrial leadership, and the ex-
istence, rhythm and possible multiplicity of industrial leadership shifts. In Section 3 we
analyze the model using formal methods, before devoting Section 4 to exploring the model
through simulations. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of the model with international
mobility of scientists. Finally, we state our conclusions.
2 The Model
Given the inherent complexity of each and every evolutionary framework, it is only possible
to progress theoretically and methodologically at the same time if we greatly simplify
previously-studied aspects. We are aware of the simplifications in our model and, hence,
when necessary, we refer to previous contributions where a more extensive treatment of
certain questions can be found.
Let us begin our model by assuming the existence of n (i = 1, ..., n) firms, each one
with a diﬀerent national identity, which compete on a worldwide level within a science-
based industry. Since we assume (for simplicity) the existence of only one firm in each
national industry, we can refer to these firms indistinctly as the national firm i, or the
national industry i3 . For clarity, we present our assumptions within three subsections:
production, growth and demand; innovation; and institutions.
3 Fatas-Villafranca et al. (2008) study the dynamics of industrial leadership in a model with distinct
firms within each national industry. However, the complexity of this model impedes the consideration of
certain aspects which we now study: the international diﬀusion of technology, the international mobility
of scientists or the application of analytical methods.
On the other hand, note that we use the concept "national firm" to point out that diﬀerent
firms/industries have features responding to a specific national identity. Therefore, "national firm" does
not mean "state firm" in our model.
7
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2.1 Production, growth & demand
Equations (1) and (2), below, formalize the assumptions underlying production and ca-
pacity growth for each national firm:
qi(t) = Ai(t)k
b
i (t), b > 0 (1)
In equation (1), we assume full capacity use (ki(t) denotes firm i‘s capacity at any
time), diﬀerent returns to scale depending on the value of parameter b, and a changing
level of technology Ai(t) at the firm level.
Equation (2) states that firms devote a constant proportion θ of their current profits
to support capacity growth4 .
·
ki = θ (p(t)− ci(t)) qi(t), θ ∈ (0, 1) (2)
The variable p(t) denotes the price the homogenous product is sold at in the worldwide
market, while ci(t) is firm i’s unit cost. It must be pointed out that we are assuming that
there is no depreciation of capital and that this does not have significant eﬀects on our
results.
In equation (3) below, we assume that the global market clears at any time as in the
Nelson and Winter (1982) models of Schumpeterian competition.
p(t) =
δ
q(t)
with q(t) =
X
j
qj(t), δ > 0 (3)
Thus, everything that is produced is sold at a price given by equation (3). Parameter
δ captures the size of the potential market on a global level5 .
4 The determinants of firms’ growth is a very controversial and interesting research topic. It is an open
issue from an empirical and theoretical perspective (see Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006). Since we cannot deal
with this question in the present paper, we refer to previous contributions by Nelson and Winter (1982)
or Metcalfe (1999) to justify our assumption.
5 Let us note that, as the global output grows driven by the dynamics of investment and technological
change, equation (3) determines that the unit price declines. This property fits a very well-known fact,
characteristic of many science-based industries.
8
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2.2 Innovation & technological change
Since we are interested in analyzing industrial leadership in industries where science-based
technological change is a key competitive weapon, we will assume that firms carry out
industrial R&D and that they fund these activities by devoting a constant proportion of
their sales (ri) at any time to R&D6 . We formalize this assumption in equation (4).
γi(t) = rip(t)qi(t), with ri ∈ (0, 1) (4)
Concerning R&D activities in the model, let us say, on the one hand, that "scientists"
are the fundamental input to carry out these activities. Therefore, firms devote their R&D
budgets (γi(t)) to hiring scientists at a price given by the national salary wi(t) of scientists
in each nation. On the other hand, let us suppose that R&D scientists within each firm
improve their firm’s technology by coming up with new processes of production (or process
improvements). In equation (5) we state that the rate of technological change at the firm
level is a function of the number of "scientists" working for the firm (hi(t)), and of the
productivity of R&D activities7 :
·
Ai
Ai
= χi(t)hi(t) =
·
αi + βi
µ
A∗(t)−Ai(t)
A∗(t)
¶¸
γi(t)
wi(t)
(5)
with 0 ≤ αi, 1 > βi and A∗(t) =Max {A1(t), ..., An(t)} .
The productivity of R&D
³
χi(t) = αi + βi
³
A∗(t)−Ai(t)
A∗(t)
´´
is determined not only by
the technological capabilities of national firms (given by αi), but also by positive exter-
nalities derived from the international diﬀusion of knowledge and technology (given by
6 See Winter (2005) or Coad and Rao (2007) for the origins, extensions and implications of this assump-
tion. Empirical evidence on the R&D to sales ratio as an operating routine can be found in, for example,
Albaladejo and Romijn (2000).
7 This assumption is habitual, both in evolutionary models (Fatas-Villafranca et al., 2008) as well as in
mainstream approaches (Romer, 1990). The classic article by Nelson (1982) - on R&D eﬃciency - provides
an excellent framework to appreciate the meaning of equation (5).
9
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βi
³
A∗(t)−Ai(t)
A∗(t)
´
). The ratio A
∗(t)−Ai(t)
A∗(t) captures the technological gap separating the i-
national industry from the leading technology at any time, while βi captures the role of
certain national supporting institutions which favor the assimilation of foreign technology.
Given the previous assumptions, it is clear that the firms in our model bear both
production costs and R&D costs. Regarding production costs, let us assume that capital
in the model plays its role as the numeraire. Nevertheless, as in Nelson and Winter (1982),
we assume that the cost and requirements per unit of capital of the essential inputs for
production (ρi) are diﬀerent for each national industry. Thus, it is clear that the firm’s
total costs will be given by ρiki(t) + γi(t). Therefore, each firm’s unit cost at t will be
given by the equation (6):
ci(t) =
ρi
Ai(t)k
b−1
i (t)
+ rip(t) (6)
2.3 Institutions: National university systems
We will assume that scientists are trained within their respective national university sys-
tems and that the number of new scientists depends on the amount of resources that each
uni-system devotes to research and training in key scientific disciplines for the industry.
We capture this assumption in equation (7):
yi(t) =
ui(t)
η
, for simplicity η = 1→ yi(t) = ui(t) (7)
we denote by ui(t) the total amount of resources that nation i devotes to university research
and training in the key disciplines, and by yi(t) the number of new scientists that finish
their training (in these key disciplines) within the i-university system at t. Clearly, 1
η
somehow represents the "productivity" of the university systems in the training of new
scientists but, for the sake of formal simplicity, we assume that it is common to all nations
and equal to one.
10
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In equation (8) we propose that the amount of resources ui(t) that each nation devotes
to research and training in key disciplines for the industry is related to the industry’s
size through the parameter λi. This parameter measures the responsiveness of nation i´s
university system to the scientific and training needs of its national industry. Then, if we
capture the size of each national industry at any time by its overall volume of sales, the
flow of new scientists will be
yi(t) = ui(t) = λip(t)qi(t), 0 < λi < 1 (8)
The distribution of parameters {λi} , i = 1, ..., n captures the disparity that exists
among diﬀerent nations regarding institutional responsiveness to industry needs.
Finally, let us consider the functioning of the market for scientists. In the general
version of the model (Section 5), we will assume that a proportion σ, (0 ≤ σ ≤ 1), of the
scientists finishing their training in each nation at any time directly decide to stay in their
country and join their national industry. The remaining proportion (1 − σ) consider the
possibility of emigrating and developing their career in another nation; we will refer to this
part (1 − σ)yi(t) of the total amount yi(t) of new scientists as the "mobile" scientists.8
As Johnson and Regets (1998) show, the motivations for scientists to develop their career
in one national industry or another include both wage diﬀerentials and non-monetary
considerations (specially considerations related to their ability to work eﬀectively in their
chosen field; see Güth (2007)). Although we will formalize this statement in Section 5,
in the other sections we will explore the dynamics of our model under conditions of an
absence of international mobility of scientists for clarity9 , that is σ = 1. Thus, if we
8 For the sake of formal tractability, we assume that international mobility only aﬀects those scientists
that finish their training at a given time t. That is, only those scientists starting out consider the possibility
of emigrating.
9 For a long time, nations relied on people trained "at home" to cover their needs for highly-skilled
labor (except for the case of top scientists and engineers; see Nelson, 1992). However, this situation has
experienced significant changes recently (see Regets, 2007).
11
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assume that the adjustment of the national salary of scientists assures market clearing,
then equation (9) will allow us to determine the dynamics of the stock of scientists in each
nation:
yi(t) =
·
hi (9)
2.4 Dynamical equations of the model
In order to deduce the fundamental equations that drive the model dynamics, we begin
by obtaining
·
wi from (9). Firstly, considering that hi(t) =
γi(t)
wi(t)
we can obtain that:
·
wi
wi
=
·
γi
γi
− yi(t)
hi(t)
Let us now consider the worldwide market share of each national firm/industry which
is given by si(t) =
qi(t)
q(t) . Then, taking equations (3), (4) and (8) into account, it is straight-
forward that:
·
wi
wi
=
·
si
si
− λiwi(t)
ri
(10)
Let us now obtain the market shares dynamics. From equations (1), (2), (4), (5) and
(6) it is clear that:
·
ki
ki
= θ
·
δ (1− ri) si(t)
ki(t)
− ρi
¸
(11)
·
Ai
Ai
=
δ
h
αi + βi
(A∗(t)−Ai(t))
A∗(t)
i
risi(t)
wi(t)
(12)
·
qi
qi
=
·
Ai
Ai
+ b
·
ki
ki
= δsi(t)


h
αi + βi
(A∗(t)−Ai(t))
A∗(t)
i
ri
wi(t)
+
bθ(1− ri)
ki(t)

− bθρi (13)
And then, considering equation (13) and the simple relationships
·
si
si
=
·
qi
qi
−
·
q
q
and
12
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·
q
q
=
P
j sj(t)
·
qj
qj
we obtain the following expression:
·
si
si
= bθ (ρ− ρi) (14)
+δ


si(t)
Ã?
αi+βi
(A∗(t)−Ai(t))
A∗(t)
?
ri
wi(t)
+ bθ(1−ri)
ki(t)
!
−
P
j s
2
j (t)


?
αj+βj
(A∗(t)−Aj(t))
A∗(t)
?
rj
wj(t)
+
bθ(1−rj)
kj(t)




with
ρ =
X
j
sj(t)ρj
Equations (10), (11), (12) and (14) characterize the model dynamics. Equation (14)
synthesizes the dynamics of market shares, while equations (10), (11) and (12) drive, re-
spectively, the dynamics of the scientific salaries, the growth of capacity and technological
change10 .
Equation (14) can be also written as:
·
si
si
=
³
Aˆi − Aˆ
´
+ b
³bki − bk´ = ³Aˆi − Aˆ´+ bθ (πi − π) , (15)
with
Aˆ =
X
j
sjAˆj ,bk =X
j
sjbkj , Aˆi = ·Ai
Ai
,bki = ·ki
ki
, πi(t) =
δ(1− ri)si(t)
ki(t)
−ρi, π =
X
j
sj(t)πj(t)
Equation (15) shows how the competitive process underlying the dynamics of market
shares is governed by the diﬀerences which exist between national rates of technological
progress and capital growth, and their respective average rates (worldwide) of variation.
For simplicity, we refer to
³
Aˆi − Aˆ
´
and
³bki − bk´as the technological component and the
expansive component of the competitive process, respectively.
10 According to equations (12) and (13), the growth rates of productivity and output will generally diﬀer
among the distinct national industries. This is a very well-known fact in industrial dynamics.
13
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3 The Model’s Dynamics
In Sections 3 and 4 we will analyze our model dynamics with the aim of clarifying the role
of diﬀerent sources of leadership and the conditions for industrial leadership shifts. In this
section, we will carry out the analytical study of the equations defining the dynamics and,
afterwards, in Section 4, we will complete the analysis with simulations.
From now on, we use the term sources of industrial leadership to refer to those techno-
logical, institutional or market factors that may allow one national firm/industry to gain
and maintain (at least temporarily) the highest share in the global market. On the other
hand, we denote by industrial leadership shifts those situations in which one firm overtakes
the previous leader in terms of market share. Likewise, we will say that one firm/industry
has consolidated its leadership in the market when, from an instant of time t∗ onwards, it
maintains its market share suﬃciently close to 1.
3.1 One particular case: the model for one isolated industry
As a first approximation to our model dynamics, let us assume that there is one national
industry that has no relationships with other nations and that it has a volume of sales
pqi = siδ. Let us also assume that there is a technological frontier A∗ which is greater
than the technological level Ai(t) of nation i. We will consider this frontier to be constant
for simplicity. Taking on these simple conjectures, if we assume the rest of conditions
which define the model, the dynamics of national industry i will be given by the following
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equations.
·
wi
wi
= −λiwi(t)
ri
(16)
·
ki
ki
= θ
·
δsi (1− ri)
ki(t)
− ρi
¸
= θπi(t)
·
Ai
Ai
=
δsiri
wi(t)
·
αi + βi
A∗ −Ai(t)
A∗
¸
The model (16) can be solved analytically11 . The path for the productive capacity is
ki(t) = −(kei − ki(0))e−ρiθt + kei (17)
with kei =
δsi(1−ri)
ρi
being the steady solution. Hence, if we suppose that the profits for
this industry are initially positive, which is the same as assuming ki(0) < kei , any solution
path ki(t) converges to kei in a strictly growing form.
The time evolution of the national salary of scientists wi(t) is driven by
wi(t) = wi(0)
1
1 + wi(0)
λi
ri
t
(18)
We will obtain the evolution of Ai(t) in two cases. In the first case we will assume
βi = 0; that is to say, there is no international diﬀusion of knowledge. In the second case,
we assume βi 6= 0. The technological level in the first case is
A
βi=0
i (t) = Ai(0)e
δsiriαi
wi(0)
t+ 1
2
δsiαiλit2 (19)
and its trajectory can be seen in Figure 1. This figure and all those in this work respond
to the standard scenario in Table 1; in each figure we only indicate those values which
diﬀer from this scenario.
11 The second equation in (16) is a linear diﬀerential equation with constant coeﬃcients with the solution
(17). From the first equation of (16), with wi(t) = 1z(t) , we can obtain (18). Once we know wi(t), if βi = 0,
the third equation of (16) can be solved as an exact diﬀerential equation obtaining (19). Finally, if βi > 0,
the previous equation is of the separate variables type, with the solution being (20).
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When we assume that βi > 0, the solution for an initial value Ai(0) is:
A
βi 6=0
i (t) =
Ai(0)
αi+βi−βi
Ai(0)
A∗
(αi + βi)e
δsiri(αi+βi)
wi(0)
t+ 1
2
δsi(αi+βi)λit
2
1 + Ai(0)
αi+βi−βi
Ai(0)
A∗
βi
A∗ e
δsiri(αi+βi)
wi(0)
t+1
2
δsi(αi+βi)λit
2
(20)
We can see that if βi > 0, there is a limit to technology growth at a level L = lim
A
βi 6=0
i (t) =
A∗(αi+βi)
βi
. This solution has been obtained with the condition of a constant
value for A∗ and it is only relevant while Aβi 6=0i (t) < A
∗. This must be borne in mind
while representing the trajectory in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
With the aid of the previous expressions, specifically (16), (17), (18), (19) and (20),
we can synthesize the main properties of the dynamics of one isolated national industry.
According to (17), the capital stock ki(t) grows constantly, tending to its steady level. It
does this at a faster rate when the propensity to invest, θ, is greater. Furthermore, from
the second equation of (16), we can interpret the process of capital accumulation as the
result of the dynamics of the profit rate12 . Likewise, let us notice that the productivity
of capital fi(t) =
qi(t)
ki(t)
= Ai(t)ki(t)
b−1, increases with technological progress and it can
increase, decrease or remain constant as capital accumulates, depending on the type of
returns to scale in the industry (b > 1,=, < 1).
On the other hand, according to (16), the salary of scientists wi(t) decreases more
quickly, the lower the R&D to sales ratio (ri) in the industry and the higher the respon-
siveness (λi) of the national university system.
The evolution of the technology level is diﬀerent depending whether the international
diﬀusion of knowledge takes place (see Figure 1). If it does occur, technological progress
12 The existence of a relationship between the rate of investment and the profit rate is a well-known fact
in economic growth.
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is faster but its evolution is more complex. If there is no diﬀusion, (19) shows that Ai(t)
grows exponentially, increasing more quickly, the lower wi(0) is, and the higher the size of
the market δsi, the productivity of R&D αi, the R&D to sales ratio ri and the institutional
responsiveness λi are.
Regarding industry growth, since qi(t) = Ai(t)ki(t)b, it is clear that the immediate
sources of growth are Ai(t) and ki(t). Therefore, the propensity to invest θ, the size of the
domestic market δsi, the low relative price of human capital, the R&D productivity αi and
the responsiveness λi of the uni-system will be growth engines, while the cost of production
inputs ρi will have a negative eﬀect. Moreover, there is a contradictory influence of the
R&D to sales ratio ri. This factor favors growth due to its positive eﬀect on technology,
but it weakens growth because of its negative eﬀects on the profit rate (and, then, on
capacity growth). As we will see, this contradictory eﬀect also exists in an open global
market.
3.2 Two national industries competing on a worldwide level
The presence of various national industries is necessary for competition to exist. The
simplest case is the one with two industries. The equations (10), (11), (12) and (14),
which characterize the dynamics of the general model, become specific in this case for
national industry 1 in
·
w1
w1
=
·
s1
s1
− λ1w1(t)
r1
(21)
·
k1
k1
= θ
·
δ (1− r1) s1(t)
k1(t)
− ρ1
¸
·
A1
A1
=
δr1s1(t)
w1(t)
·
α1 + β1
A∗(t)−A1(t)
A∗(t)
¸
·
s1
s1
= (1− s1(t))
h
Aˆ1 − Aˆ2 + b
³bk1 − bk2´i
Firstly, let us consider the case without international diﬀusion of knowledge, β1 = 0.
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We will study the local evolution of market shares starting from the Taylor polynomial
approximation of s1(t), which is13 :
s1(t) = s1(0) + s˙1(0)t+
1
2
s¨1(0)t
2 + .. (22)
= s1(0) + s1(0)(1− s1(0))


·
A1(0)
A1(0)
−
·
A2(0)
A2(0)
+ b


·
k1(0)
k1(0)
−
·
k2(0)
k2(0)



 t
+
1
2
s˙1(0)(1− 2s1(0))


·
A1(0)
A1(0)
−
·
A2(0)
A2(0)
+ b


·
k1(0)
k1(0)
−
·
k2(0)
k2(0)



 t2
+
1
2
s1(0)(1− s1(0)) [δα1λ1s1(0)− δα2λ2s2(0)] t2
+
1
2
s˙1(0)s1(0)(1− s1(0))b




·
k1(0)
k1(0)
+ θρ1

 1
s1(0)
+


·
k2(0)
k2(0)
+ θρ2

 1
s2(0)

 t2
−1
2
s1(0)(1− s1(0))b


·
k1(0)
k1(0)


·
k1(0)
k1(0)
+ θρ1

−
·
k2(0)
k2(0)


·
k2(0)
k2(0)
+ θρ2



 t2 + ..
The expression of s˙1(0) in (22) shows what the main factors favoring the growth of the
market share for national industry 1 are. Industry 2 will experience similar factors and,
as these favor the competitive advantage of 2, they will be negative for 1. If we observe
·
A1(0)
A1(0)
+ b
·
k1(0)
k1(0)
= δs1(0)
µ
r1α1
w1(0)
+ bθ
1− r1
k1(0)
¶
− bθρ1
we can state that the initial value of the market share s1(0), the productivity of R&D,
and low salaries are all favorable factors for the growth of industry 1. On the contrary, the
cost of production inputs ρ1 is a negative factor for the industry, and the R&D to sales
ratio r1 has a contradictory influence. The role of these and other factors can be better
appreciated if the above-mentioned expression is rewritten in the following way:
·
A1(0)
A1(0)
+ b
·
k1(0)
k1(0)
= α1h1(0) + bθ[p(0)(1− r1)
q1(0)
k1(0)
− ρ1]
The higher the number of scientists (h1(0)) and their productivity in the national
industry (α1), and the higher the productivity of capital (
q1(0)
k1(0)
), the greater industry 1’s
13 This Taylor expansion, expressed as a function of the initial values and parameters, is available upon
request.
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competitive advantage and its rate of industry growth will be. The negative eﬀect of ρ1
on the profit rate is clear, while the contradictory eﬀect of the R&D to sales ratio (r1)
consists of, on the one hand, favoring a higher number of scientists in the industry and,
on the other hand, implying a smaller profit rate. All the common parameters - that is,
the potential market size δ, the returns to scale factor b and the propensity to invest θ−
favor industrial growth and, as we will see in the simulations, they all also accelerate the
process of market competition.
Apart from the above-mentioned factors, there are other sources which are seemingly
less significant for industrial leadership. One way to see them is to observe s¨1(0) in (22)
(coeﬃcient of t2) assuming s˙1(0) = 0; with this hypothesis, the sign of s¨1(0) coincides with
that of
δα1λ1s1(0)− δα2λ2s2(0)− b


·
k1(0)
k1(0)


·
k1(0)
k1(0)
+ θρ1

−
·
k2(0)
k2(0)


·
k2(0)
k2(0)
+ θρ2




We can clearly see that the responsiveness λ1 of the university system is a favorable
factor for market share growth which has not appeared previously. Since
·
hi
hi
= λi
ri
wi(t) , the
responsiveness of national uni-systems is essential for the growth of the number of skilled
national scientists. This result reveals that the lack of responsiveness by uni-systems may
block the competitive advantage of national industries in certain conditions.
Given the diﬃculty in obtaining global close-form market shares solutions, we will rely
on (22) to find conditions that ensure that s1(t) grows around t = 0. The most immediate
suﬃcient condition is s˙1(0) > 0, which becomes:
δs1(0)r1α1
w1(0)
+ b
µ
δs1(0) (1− r1)
k1(0)
− ρ1
¶
θ >
δs2(0)r2α2
w2(0)
+ b
µ
δs2(0) (1− r2)
k2(0)
− ρ2
¶
θ (23)
However, with international diﬀusion of technology (βi > 0) neither (22) nor (23) are
valid. If we suppose that the technological frontier is A∗(t) = A2(t), the new Taylor
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expansion for s1(t), which can be obtained from (21), will be:
s1(t) = s1(0) + s˙1(0)t+ .. (24)
= s1(0) + s1(0)(1− s1(0))


δr1α1s1(0)
w1(0)
+ δr1s1(0)
w1(0)
³
β1 − β1
A1(0)
A∗(0)
´
− δr2α2s2(0)
w2(0)
+bθ
³
δ(1−r1)s1(0)
k1(0)
− ρ1 −
δ(1−r2)s2(0)
k2(0)
+ ρ2
´

 t+ ..
Once again, the condition s˙1(0) > 0 is suﬃcient for the growth of s1, and in this case
it becomes:
δr1s1(0)α1
w1(0)
+ δr1s1(0)
w1(0)
³
β1 − β1
A1(0)
A∗(0)
´
+ bθ
³
δs1(0)(1−r1)
k1(0)
− ρ1
´
>
δs2(0)r2α2
w2(0)
+ bθ
³
δs2(0)(1−r2)
k2(0)
− ρ2
´ (25)
If we compare (23) and (25), we observe that both expressions diﬀer in
δr1s1(0)
w1(0)
µ
β1 − β1
A1(0)
A∗(0)
¶
,
which captures the eﬀect of international diﬀusion. As a consequence, if the parameters
and the initial conditions ki(0), wi(0) were identical in both industries, the share of indus-
try 1 could grow and, consequently, industry 2’s market share would fall, despite starting
out as leader. This shows that international diﬀusion is a powerful mechanism that may
erode the advantage of the leader.
Finally, to sum up, the above-mentioned arguments allow us to oﬀer some general
conclusions:
1. If there is no international diﬀusion of technology, the stabilization of market shares
for the case in which both industries remain in the market is not to be expected.
This stabilization requires, among other things, that s˙1(t) = 0 and s¨1(t) = 0 are
fulfilled from a given t and this is unlikely. It is to be expected that the industry
that enjoys a clear advantage, either through innovation (higher αi, λi or ri ) or
through capacity expansion (lower ρi or ri), will consolidate its leadership. See
Figure 2a, where industry 2 enjoys a higher productivity of R&D.
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2. If there is international diﬀusion of knowledge and technology, there will be a wide
range of parametric values allowing the "non-leader" to increase its market share. It
can also impede the leader industry from cementing its leadership. These situations
are favored by values of the returns-to-scale parameter lower than 1 (b < 1) because
the lower b is, the higher the weight of growth via innovation compared to that via
capacity expansion. This type of situation is also produced if the propensity to invest
(θ) is too low. See Figure 2b.
3. Whether there is international diﬀusion of technology or not, in both cases we can
find surprising industrial leadership shifts. Thus, in Figure 2c, with technology
diﬀusion, we show how the emerging national industry (industry 1), with an initial
market share of 0.11, manages to take over the market from the initial market leader
(industry 2 with an initial share of 0.89). The sources underlying this surprising
leadership shift are, on the one hand, the cheap access to production inputs (ρi) for
industry 1, and, on the other hand, the higher responsiveness (λi) of industry 1’s
university system. These kinds of surprising leadership shifts are relatively frequent
in real high-tech industries (see Mowery and Nelson, 1999).
FIGURE 2
3.3 The model with n national industries in global competition
The model with n firms/industries generalizes what we have seen for the case of 2 national
industries. The equations (10), (11), (12) and (14) characterize the dynamics of the general
model. When there is no international diﬀusion βi = 0, the development of Taylor similar
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to (22) is:
s1(t) = s1(0) + s1(0)


·
A1(0)
A1(0)
−
X
j
sj(0)
·
Aj(0)
Aj(0)
+ b


·
k1(0)
k1(0)
−
X
j
sj(0)
·
kj(0)
kj(0)



 t (26)
+
1
2
s˙1(0)


·
A1(0)
A1(0)
−
X
j
sj(0)
·
Aj(0)
Aj(0)
+ b


·
k1(0)
k1(0)
−
X
j
sj(0)
·
kj(0)
kj(0)



 t2
+
1
2
s1(0)


δα1λ1s1(0)−
P
j sj(0)δαjλjsj(0)
−
P
j sj(0)
·
Aj(0)
Aj(0)
· ·
Aj(0)
Aj(0)
−
P
r sr(0)
·
Ar(0)
Ar(0)
+ b
µ ·
kj(0)
kj(0)
−
P
r sr(0)
·
kr(0)
kr(0)
¶¸

 t
2
+
1
2
s1(0)b


◦z }| {

·
k1(0)
k1(0)

−
◦z }| {
X
j
sj(0)
·
kj(0)
kj(0)




t2 + ...
The coeﬃcient of t in (26) again shows that, the greater the following expression, the
more national industry 1 will grow:
·
A1(0)
A1(0)
+ b
·
k1(0)
k1(0)
=
δα1r1s1(0)
w1(0)
+ bθ
·
δ (1− r1) s1(0)
k1(0)
− ρ1
¸
This also allows us to generalize what we have already seen in the case of two national
industries with respect to the factors underlying the sources of leadership. Moreover, as
in the case of 2 industries, we can use (26) to obtain suﬃcient conditions for the growth
of s1(t). The requirement s˙1(0) > 0 leads to the condition
δα1r1s1(0)
w1(0)
+ bθ
h
δ(1−r1)s1(0)
k1(0)
− ρ1
i
>P
j sj(0)
δαjrjsj(0)
wj(0)
+
P
j sj(0)bθ
h
δ(1−rj)sj(0)
kj(0)
− ρj
i
And if we compare two industries, we can assure that s1(t) grows (and it does so
relatively more than the industry i0s market share) if
δs1(0)r1α1
w1(0)
+ b
·
δs1(0) (1− r1)
k1(0)
− ρ1
¸
θ >
δsi(0)riαi
wi(0)
+ b
·
δsi(0) (1− ri)
ki(0)
− ρi
¸
θ (27)
Furthermore, if we assume that there is international diﬀusion and that the leading
national industry is n, the technological frontier will be A∗(t) = An(t). The Taylor
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expansion of s1(t), similar to (26) will be:
s1(t) = s1(0) + s˙1(0)t+ .. (28)
= s1(0) + s1(0)


δα1r1s1(0)
w1(0)
+ δr1s1(0)
w1(0)
³
β1 − β1
A1(0)
An(0)
´
−
P
j sj(0)
h
δαjrjsj(0)
wj(0)
+
δrjsj(0)
wj(0)
³
βj − βj
Aj(0)
An(0)
´i
+b
³
θ
h
δ(1−r1)s1(0)
k1(0)
− ρ1
i
−
P
j sj(0)θ
h
δ(1−rj)sj(0)
kj(0)
− ρj
i´


t+ ..
which shows that a suﬃcient condition for s1(t) to grow in a neighborhood of t = 0 is:
·
A1(0)
A1(0)
+ b
·
k1(0)
k1(0)
>
X
j
sj
·
Aj(0)
Aj(0)
+ b
X
j
sj
·
kj(0)
kj(0)
(29)
⇐⇒ δα1r1s1(0)
w1(0)
+
δr1s1(0)
w1(0)
µ
β1 − β1
A1(0)
An(0)
¶
+bθ
·
δ (1− r1) s1(0)
k1(0)
− ρ1
¸
>
X
j
sj(0)


δαjrjsj(0)
wj(0)
+
δrjsj(0)
wj(0)
³
βj − βj
Aj(0)
An(0)
´
+bθ
h
δ(1−rj)sj(0)
kj(0)
− ρj
i


If we only consider the relative growth of industry 1 with respect to the leader, the
condition will be
δr1s1(0)α1
w1(0)
+
δr1s1(0)
w1(0)
µ
β1 − β1
A1(0)
A∗(0)
¶
+ bθ
µ
δs1(0) (1− r1)
k1(0)
− ρ1
¶
(30)
>
δsn(0)rnαn
wn(0)
+ bθ
µ
δsn(0) (1− rn)
kn(0)
− ρn
¶
If we compare (27) and (30), we can see the essential diﬀerence in:
δr1s1(0)
w1(0)
µ
β1 − β1
A1(0)
A∗(0)
¶
,
which captures the eﬀect of the international diﬀusion of knowledge.
A careful look at these suﬃcient conditions, and given the similarity with how we
obtained them for the case of two nations, allows us to aﬃrm the same three general
conclusions that we stated for the case of two industries. Hence, the general validity of
those conclusions is confirmed.
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Finally, let us show to what extent certain institutional factors may matter for in-
dustrial leadership in high-tech industries. We will pay attention to the requirements of
scientists in the model. Let us note that we can restate equation (15) as:
·
si
si
=
³
χi(t)hi(t)− Aˆ
´
+ bθ (πi(t)− π)
Then, the following suﬃcient condition for national industry i not to lose its share in the
global market can be obtained:
·
si ≥ 0⇔ hi(t) ≥
Aˆ+ bθ (π − πi(t))
χi(t)
.
Note that Aˆ+bθ(π−πi(t))
χi(t)
represents a minimal (variable) threshold for the number of
scientists. The faster the rate (Aˆ) of technical change in the sector and the lower the
productivity of R&D, the greater this threshold will be. If we relate this result to the
arguments put forward by Mazzoleni and Nelson (2007), and we remember that
·
hi =
λiδsi(t) (with δsi(t) being normally lower in developing nations), we can appreciate to
what extent responsive university systems (with high values of λi) are a fundamental
factor for emergent industries seeking to catch-up. To illustrate this result, we show in
Figure 2d how the proportions of scientists evolve during the surprising leadership shift
depicted in Figure 2c. As we can see by comparing both Figures, the market shares, and
the proportions of scientists working in each nation show strongly-related dynamics during
the process.
4 Simulations
4.1 The Sources of industrial leadership
To complete the analysis of the previous Section, we will carry out simulations for three
national industries (n = 3) which allow a certain generalization of the results obtained
for the sources of leadership. The consideration of more industries, n = 4, 5, .., would
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doubtlessly be interesting but, at the same time, would make the analysis more diﬃcult
and less clear. The simulation with three industries is already very complex and shows
all the relevant cases. Hence, simulations with more than three industries would not oﬀer
a qualitative leap, although more industries would mean more shifts. The drivers of the
leadership shifts are the same and the general conclusions obtained with the model for
n = 2 are still correct.
To be specific, we will analyze, for the case of three industries, the role played by
λi, βi, αi, ri and ρi, and by the common parameters θ, b and δ. Firstly, we will analyze
the isolated influence of each factor. Secondly, we will explore some of their interactions.
Finally, we will measure the weight of each source of leadership.
To isolate the eﬀect of one factor (one parameter), we will consider that all other
parameters have the same value for each national industry, except the factor we wish to
study, which verifies that:
x1 = x2(1− ax) < x2 < x3 = x2(1 + ax),
where x represents the factor we study (x = λi, αi, ri or ρi) and ax the degree of hetero-
geneity.
We will run the simulations departing from the standard scenario - see Table 1. The
values of the initial conditions and parameters in this setting are chosen because they rep-
resent plausible conditions. Thus, we assume that all firms start out from a positive profit
situation; R&D costs are significantly lower than production costs; parameters λi, ri are
taken such that the growth rate of the national stock of scientists (λiwi(t)
ri
) is plausible; and,
finally, in accordance with previous contributions (Nelson and Winter, 1982 or Kwasnicki
and Kwasnicka, 1992), we have chosen plausible values for ri, θ, δ, ki(0) and Ai(0).
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TABLE 1
4.1.1 Analyzing the influence of each factor without international diﬀusion
Firstly, we analyze the isolated eﬀect of each factor assuming that there is no diﬀusion
(βi = 0). The most relevant conclusion is that the industry with a higher λi, αi or lower ρi
will become leader. These results do not depend on the degrees of heterogeneity (aλ, aα or
aρ); if we set these parameters at higher values, then the leadership is consolidated more
quickly. This reinforces our local results in Section 3, generalizing them for the complete
dynamic process. Moreover, as was to be expected from the local analysis, increasing
parameters θ, b, and δ, accelerates the rise to industrial leadership. An example of uni-
versity systems as a source of leadership can be seen in Figure 3a, where the leadership
shift is produced because nation 2’s uni-system is more responsive than the uni-system
of the initial leader (national industry 1). Nevertheless, we have chosen the example to
show also how industry 3 (the one enjoying the most responsive uni-system) fails to reach
leadership because it departs from an initial market share which turns out to be too small.
This result anticipates that the interactions between diﬀerent factors as determinants of
leadership matter, as we will explain later in more detail.
FIGURE 3
The contradictory eﬀect of ri, which we have seen analytically, is also maintained in
the simulations. It is not clear that investing more in R&D is always a source of leadership.
It strongly depends on the salary of national scientists. The simulations show that for low
initial values of the salary, the R&D to sales ratio is a source of leadership (see Figure 4a);
while for suﬃciently high salary values the industry with the lowest ri becomes the leader
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(Figure 4b).
FIGURE 4
4.1.2 Analyzing the influence of each factor with international diﬀusion
The aforementioned results can vary strongly if we suppose that there is international
diﬀusion of technology. The simulations show that if the international diﬀusion is suﬃ-
ciently intense, there are qualitative changes in the market shares dynamics, as we have
already seen in Section 3. In these situations, the industries following the leader may
assimilate technical advantages via the technological component in equation (15). This
allows them to delay or even impede the leader’s consolidation of their position, leading
to situations of market sharing between various national industries. The simulations also
show that the influence of international diﬀusion is greater, the lower the returns to scale
and the propensity to invest in the global sector. In Figure 3b we show how the time
evolution already presented in Figure 3a changes when there is international diﬀusion and
lower returns to scale. In this case, the emerging industry (industry 3), which was sinking
at the start in Figure 3a, ends up taking over the market, although sharing it with the
challenging industry (industry 2).
4.2 Estimating the relative influence of diﬀerent sources of industrial
leadership
Once the eﬀects have been analyzed one by one, it is useful to estimate how these factors
contribute to industrial leadership when they act together. We will see this econometrically
by estimating the weight of each source of leadership, starting out from data obtained from
simulations of the model. The departure point is given by the following specified relation:
t∗((1 + aα)α)
φα((1 + aρ)ρ)
φρ((1 + aλ)λ)
φλ((1 + ar)r)
φr = C,
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where the weight of each source of leadership will be given by the estimation of the
corresponding exponent. The convenience of using the specified relation is supported by
our econometric results.
The results of the fits are reported in Table 2 which includes the parameter estimates,
their t−values and R2. We have carried out eight diﬀerent estimations by applying the
non-linear least-squares method. As can be seen in Table 2, we have considered βi = 0 in
two of the fits, and βi 6= 0 in the rest of them. To capture the eﬀects of the returns to
scale we have considered b = 1.1 in four fits, and b = 0.8 in the others.
For every possible combination (βi, b) in Table 2 we run the model 57 times to obtain
diﬀerent values of t∗ - the instant of time in which we consider the leader’s market share to
be suﬃciently close to 1. In each run, we start out from the parametric values of industry 2
in the standard scenario (Table 1), and we systematically change one or several parametric
values for industries 1 and 3. To be specific, we consider variations of ax between 0.01 and
0.09.
TABLE 2
We can clearly see in our table that the specified relation is very explicative, since
the R2 values are higher than 0.76 in all cases and, in general, much higher, sometimes
approaching the value of 1. This gives us the confidence to believe that our conclusions
are solid ones. Regarding the weight of the sources, we can see in Table 2 that ρ and α
are the ones with a greater value (higher φρ, φα) and are always higher than the weights
of λ and r. In the case of φλ and φr we always get φλ > φr (except for βi = 0.01 , b = 1.1
when they are almost equal). Comparing the order of the weights φρ, φα we observe that
it is not always the same. It strongly depends on the existence of international diﬀusion
of knowledge and, if diﬀusion is suﬃciently low, it is conditioned by the type of returns
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to scale. To sum up, in normal situations with international diﬀusion, we may find either
the order φρ > φα > φλ > φr , or φα > φρ > φλ > φr when diﬀusion is not intense and
there are decreasing returns.
These results were to be expected from our previous conclusions since α and ρ had
a very strong influence on the consolidation of leadership. The former parameter influ-
ences leadership via the technological component in equation (15), and the latter via the
expansive component. As we have also mentioned, the parameter which measures the
responsiveness of the university system (λ) does not exercise a direct influence on market
share dynamics (it appears in the second term of the Taylor expansion). Therefore, it is
not unusual that its estimated influence on leadership is lower than that of parameters
such as α or ρ, which have a direct influence. However, we must not forget the conclusions
of Section 3 regarding the role of university systems.
It also makes sense that the estimated weight of the R&D to sales ratio r be even
lower, given that this factor has a positive eﬀect on the technological component, but a
negative one on the expansive component.
The change in order between φρ and φα when there is international diﬀusion is due to
the fact that, if the diﬀusion of technology is suﬃciently intense, then the technological
component in equation (15) becomes less influential as a source of leadership, and the key
source of leadership turns out to be the price of essential inputs for production (ρ via the
capacity expansion component in equation (15)).
4.3 Industrial leadership shifts
In this section we briefly try to complement the preceding simulations by looking at the
possibility of leadership shifts in the market. We have already commented on this possibil-
ity in preceding sections - see Figures 2c, 3a and 3b. If there is no international diﬀusion
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of knowledge (βi = 0), the results of our simulations are clear. Any industry may become
leader, whether it be the industry with an advantage over the others granted by one of
its leadership sources, or an industry which has not been favored by any of the sources.
The simulations show that the joint eﬀects of market, technological and institutional fac-
tors can lead to a surprising leadership if they are suitably combined in a given national
industry. Moreover, if there is technology diﬀusion (βi > 0), we can find situations in
which consolidated leadership is not achieved by any of the industries. These situations
are favored by decreasing returns to scale (b < 1) and by low propensities to invest (low θ).
Figure 5a and Figure 5b illustrate this possibility without and with international diﬀusion
of technology.
FIGURE 5
5 International mobility of scientists
We now consider a more general version of our model taking into account the international
mobility of scientists. Let us assume, that a proportion σ, (0 ≤ σ < 1), of the scientists who
finalize their training in each nation at any time decides, directly, to remain in their nation
and join their national industry. The remaining proportion (1−σ) consider the possibility
of emigrating and developing their career in another nation. Thus, the number of new
scientists that directly join their national industry is σyi(t), and the overall (worldwide)
number of mobile scientists at any time will be (1− σ)
P
j yj(t).
Now, if we denote by υi(t), (0 ≤ υi(t) ≤ 1,
P
j υj(t) = 1), the proportion of the overall
number of mobile scientists which decide to join the national industry i at t, it is clear
that the condition of market clearing for the market of scientists in nation i will be:
σyi(t) + (1− σ)υi(t)
X
j
yj(t) =
·
hi (31)
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Obviously, this equation generalizes equation (9). Therefore, we can obtain from (31)
the generalized dynamics of the salary of scientists which substitute equation (10):
·
wi
wi
=
·
si
si
− wi(t)
ri

σλi + (1− σ)
υi(t)
si(t)
X
j
sj(t)λj

 (32)
In order to formalize the dynamics driving the evolution of {υi(t)}ni=1, we consider that
scientists decide to develop their career in one national industry or another depending both
on the wage diﬀerentials and on other non-monetary considerations. Among the latter,
the possibilities perceived by scientists with regards to their ability to work eﬀectively in
their chosen field are fundamental (Güth, 2007; Regets, 2007). In our model, the greater
or lesser eﬀectiveness of the scientists’ work is determined by the diﬀerent productivity
of R&D (χi(t)) in the distinct national industries. Thus, if we denote by ε, (0 < ε < 1)
the relative sensitivity of scientists to non-monetary considerations, we can state that the
evolution of {υi(t)}ni=1 is given by the following replicator dynamics system:
·
υi
υi
= (1− ε) (wi(t)− wυ) + ε (χi(t)− χυ) (33)
with wυ =
P
j υj(t)wj(t) and χυ =
P
j υj(t)χj(t).
Clearly, the model’s dynamics for the case with international mobility of scientists are
determined by equations (11), (12), (14), (32) and (33). We shall see (via simulations)
some of the properties of this version of the model.
FIGURE 6
The simulations show that, in general, all the results obtained in the version without
mobility regarding factors of growth and their relevance are maintained even when there
is mobility. The same can be said regarding the existence of surprising leadership shifts.
However, based upon the numerous simulations carried out (some of which are shown in
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Figure 6), we can also point out that the international mobility of scientists favors the
appearance and disappearance of leadership shifts. If a national industry is not a leader
but it does attract scientists trained in this discipline, this competitive advantage can help
it to achieve the leadership. As well as this, mobility can generate successive leadership
shifts between diﬀerent industries. In Figure 6b, we can see how leadership shifts between
industries are carried out without any of the industries actually leaving the market (the
situation represented is the same as in Figure 3b, but assuming that any scientist is willing
to develop their career in a diﬀerent nation from the one they studied or trained in, σ = 0).
In the same way, if we observe Figure 6a, we can confirm that the leadership shift seen
in Figure 3a disappears. In this case, the scientists’ mobility (σ = 0.6) means that the
initial leader (industry 1) attracts scientists in such a way that the competitive advantages
of the other two industries are not suﬃcient to seize the leadership. It has been shown
that if the mobility is low (σ = 0.8) the leadership shift of Figure 3a re-appears.
Finally, we point out that other simulations for diﬀerent ε have shown that the greater
or lesser weight of monetary factors is very significant in questions of mobility. This,
doubtlessly requires a deeper future study. This analysis will have to include a more
complex definition of the salary evolution of scientists, also taking on board other factors
such as legal labor conditions, freedom for investigation, and social recognition, among
others.
6 Conclusions
Our aim in this work has been to propose a suitable model for the dynamic analysis of
industrial leadership and industry growth in science-based industries. We have posed a
model which, apart from moving in this direction, incorporates a richer body of institutions
than are dealt with at present and fits with the conception of development as a catch-up
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problem. We have analyzed diﬀerent versions of the model, with increasing complexity,
by using formal methods and simulations.
The study of the model for the case of one isolated industry (as a first approximation to
the general dynamics) reveals that only the second of the two immediate sources of growth
in the model - capital accumulation and technological change — maintains its potential in
the long term. The first source is strongly linked to θ (propensity to invest) and ρi
(cost of production inputs), while the second one can be identified with αi (technological
capabilities), βi (absorptive capacity), λi (responsiveness of uni-systems) and ri (R&D to
sales ratio).
This version of the model (one isolated nation) clearly shows the positive role of lower
values of ρi and higher values of αi and λi. Furthermore it shows the ambiguous role of ri as
a source of leadership. Thus, we have demonstrated that maintaining a high R&D to sales
ratio is not always the most eﬃcient strategic behavior. It will depend on the productivity
of R&D, on the national salary of skilled labor, on the productivity of capital and on the
existence of scale economies. This model also shows the crucial roles of the training in
university systems and the absorptive capacity of nations for the rhythm of technological
change. Moreover, if the national industry’s absorptive capacity is suﬃciently high, the
international diﬀusion of leading technology will significantly accelerate industry growth.
The analysis of more complex versions of the model (2 or more national industries in
global competition) confirms all the results obtained for the simplest case, and reveals
new properties of the model. In these models we have used the Taylor polynomial approx-
imation for the time-evolution of market shares to obtain (local) analytical results and
simulations to assure the validity of these results at a global level.
The simulations allow us to apply econometric techniques to evaluate the relative
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and direct influence of diﬀerent leadership sources (ρi, αi, λi and ri), setting out from
a plausible standard scenario. The coeﬃcients of direct impact we have obtained point
to the production cost per unit of capital and the productivity of R&D as being those
factors with the highest impact, followed by the responsiveness of uni-systems. They
are the engines of growth and the factors which facilitate the rise to leadership and its
consolidation. Once again, the international diﬀusion of knowledge conditions the nature
of the results. More precisely, if the absorptive capacity of all the national industries is
such that there is international diﬀusion of leading technology, the role of cheap access to
essential production inputs as a source of leadership is intensified. This result seems to
indicate that, if the technology is diﬀused internationally with facility, other factors (such
as the privileged access to certain raw materials, energy, etc.) take on a crucial role.
Likewise, we have seen that, in certain cases, the rise to industrial leadership is not
achieved by those competitors with a clear advantage in one (or several) sources of leader-
ship, but rather by those who enjoy a suﬃciently good combination of distinct factors. This
result may explain the frequent existence of surprising leadership shifts in science-based
industries.
Moreover, the international diﬀusion of knowledge and leading technology makes it
diﬃcult for one single industry to consolidate its market leadership and favors catching-up
and the appearance of surprising leadership shifts. We have shown that, for non-leading
industries, maintaining a position in the global market may be diﬃcult (or even impossible)
if the international diﬀusion of knowledge does not reach a certain intensity. These eﬀects
are even more relevant, the lower the returns to scale in the industry and the initial leader’s
propensity to invest. Given that the international diﬀusion of technology only takes place if
the national industries have suﬃcient absorptive capacity, these results highlight the role of
34
Page 37 of 48
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
certain supporting institutions (public research institutions, international collaborations,
etc.) for developing industries seeking to catch up.
We have also shown (in subsection 3.3) that there is a minimum (variable) stock of
scientists that any industry requires so as not to lose market share in the global market.
This necessary minimum stock will be greater, the higher the rhythm of technological
progress in the sector and the lower the productivity of R&D. If we apply this result
to the present reality of high-tech industries, we see that the acceleration of the rate of
technological change, and the tightening of the copy conditions as a consequence of the
TRIPS agreement, suggest the increase in the minimum stock of scientists needed by any
industry trying to, at least, maintain its position. This seems to strengthen the role of
national uni-systems and public research institutions (being training centers and attractors
of highly-skilled labor) as sources of leadership and development engines in science-based
industries.
Finally, our brief analysis of the model with international mobility of scientists seems
to confirm the previous results. The principal eﬀect of mobility consists of increasing
the possibility of leadership shifts as it alters the competitive conditions between distinct
national industries. The model with mobility has clearly shown the relevance of this aspect
and suggests the need for a deeper future study.
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List of Symbols 
 
qi level of production of the i-firm/industry. 
ki capital stock of the i-firm/industry. 
ci firm i’s unit cost. 
Ai level of technology of the i-firm/industry. 
A* Technological frontier. 
wi salary of scientists in nation i. 
ri firm i’s R&D to sales ratio. 
ui university budget devoted to a relevant scientific discipline in nation i. 
yi number of scientists finishing their training at the i-national uni-system at any time. 
hi number of scientists working in the i-national industry. 
si firm/industry i’s global market share. 
fi firm/industry i’s capital productivity. 
n number of firms/national industries. 
p  product price. 
t  time. 
iγ  firm/industry i’s R&D budget. 
iρ  firm/industry i’s production costs per unit of capital. 
iπ  firm/industry i’s profit rate per unit of capital. 
iλ  national university system i’s institutional responsiveness. 
iα  firm/industry i’s technological capabilities. 
iβ  firm/industry i’s absorptive capacity. 
iχ  firm/industry i’s productivity of R&D. 
vi share of new mobile scientists that join the i-national industry. 
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δ  size of the global market potential. 
b returns to scale parameter. 
ax heterogeneity degree regarding the x-factor (simulations). 
x factor that we study in each case (simulations). 
xφ  Weight of the x-source of leadership (econometrics). 
θ  propensity to invest. 
ε  sensitivity of mobile scientists to non-monetary factors.  
σ  level of rigidity in the international mobility of scientists. 
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Table 1. Standard Scenario 
Industry ki(0) Ai(0) wi(0) βi ri αi ρi λi General Value 
1 10 1 or 1.1 1 0 or 0.5 0.02 0.05 1.1 0.002 δ 50 
2 10 1.1 1 0 or 0.5 0.02 0.05 1.1 0.002 θ 0.2 
3 10 1.2 or 1.1 1 0 or 0.5 0.02 0.05 1.1 0.002 b 0.8 or 1.1 
 
Table 2. The relative weight of different sources of leadership 
  φα φρ φλ φr R2 
b = 1.1 3.13902
 
(10.054) 
5.4027 
(17.3402) 
1.81971 
(5.81396) 
1.52815
 
(4.89456) 0.895207 βi  = 0 
b = 0.8 3.78228
 
(13.5852) 
3.68589 
(13.2663) 
2.43679 
(8.73075) 
1.60784 
(5.77501) 0.895062 
b = 1.1 1.05134
 
(17.7021) 
1.87383 
(31.6159) 
0.440438 
(7.39752) 
0.447815 
 (7.54012) 0.963803 βi  = 0.01 
b = 0.8 1.47217
 
(40.1575) 
1.38696 
(37.9113) 
0.968431 
(26.3511) 
0.618209 
(16.8634) 0.986483 
b = 1.1 3.87734
 
(7.87644) 
8.5566 
(17.4178) 
2.2803 
(4.62071) 
1.50028
  
(3.04767) 0.881726 βi  = 0.1 
b = 0.8 9.70067
 
(7.04141) 
13.2 
(9.60122) 
7.46799 
(5.40733) 
2.54059 
(1.84414)
 (**)
 
0.763809 
b = 1.1 3.49699
 
(4.8463) 
14.4075 
(20.0079) 
2.10639 
(2.9119) 
0.48249 
(0.668659)
 (**)
 
0.892365 βi  = 0.5 
b = 0.8 (*) (*) (*) (*)
 
 (*) 
(*) Fit not possible since several firms survive. 
(**) The value is not significant. 
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Figure 1: The case of one isolated industry 
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Figure 2: The case of two national industries 
(- - - - firm 1;  ──  firm 2) 
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b = 0.8, β i = 0.8, λ 1 = 0.005 > λ2 = 0.002, ρ 1 = 1.1 < ρ2 = 1.2
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Figure 3: The case of three national industries 
(- - - - - firm 1; ─   ─   ─  firm 2; ──  firm 3) 
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 Figure 4: The role of the R&D to sales ratio ri  
 (- - - - - firm 1; ─   ─   ─  firm 2; ──  firm 3) 
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Figure 5: Industrial leadership shifts 
 (- - - - - firm 1; ─   ─   ─  firm 2; ──  firm 3) 
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Figure 6: International mobility of scientists 
(- - - - - firm 1; ─   ─   ─  firm 2; ──  firm 3) 
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